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1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks usually comprise a number of sensors with limited resources. 
Each sensor includes sensing equipment, a data processing unit, a short range radio device 
and a battery [Pottie & Kaiser, 2000; Kahn et al.,1999; Akyildiz, 2002]. These networks have 
been considered for various purposes including border security, military target tracking and 
scientific research in dangerous environments [Perrig et. al., 2002; Kung & Vlah, 2003; 
Brooks, 2003]. Since the sensors may reside in an unattended and/or hostile environment, 
security is a critical issue. An adversary could easily access the wireless channel and 
intercept the transmitted information, or distribute false information in the network. Under 
such circumstances, authentication and confidentiality should be used to achieve network 
security. Since authentication and confidentiality protocols require a shared key between 
entities, key management is one of the most challenging issues in wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs) [Perrig et. al., 2002]. 
In the literature, key management protocols are based on either symmetric or asymmetric 
cryptographic functions [Perrig et. al., 2002]. Due to resource limitations in the sensors, key 
management protocols based on public keys are not suitable [Perrig et. al., 2002], [Chan et. 
al., 2003]. Hence, key management protocols based on symmetric cryptographic functions 
have been extensively investigated [Chan et. al., 2003-Fanian et.al, May 2010]. There are two 
types of symmetric key management schemes based on an on-demand trust center or key 
pre-distribution. With an on-demand trust center, the center must generate common keys 
for every pair of nodes that wish to establish a secure connection. Due to the lack of an 
infrastructure in WSNs, this scheme is not suitable. With key pre-distribution, key material 
is distributed among all nodes prior to deployment.  In this scheme, each node carries a set 
of keys to establish a secure connection with other nodes. 
A number of key pre-distribution schemes have been developed. A very simple approach is to 
have a unique pre-loaded key that is shared among the nodes. Then all sensors can encrypt or 
decrypt data between themselves using this key. Due to its simplicity, this method is very 
efficient in regards to memory usage and processing overhead, but it suffers from a very 
serious security problem. If even one of the sensors is captured by an adversary, the security of 
the entire network will be compromised. Another simple approach, called the basic scheme, is 
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to generate a distinct key between every pair of sensors and store these in the sensors. In this 
case, if N sensors are deployed in the network, each must store N-1 keys. Despite ideal 
resilience, this scheme is not scalable, and is not memory efficient, particularly in large 
networks. In addition, after node deployment, if a new node wants to join the network, none 
of the previously deployed sensors will have a common key with the new node. Recently, 
many key establishment protocols have been proposed to address this problem [Chan et. al., 
2003- Fanian et. al., 2010], but as we will show most have security or performance issues. These 
schemes are based on random key pre-distribution, symmetric polynomials and/or the Blom 
scheme. As shown in the analysis section, with the protocols based on random key pre-
distribution, an adversary can obtain the common key between non-compromised sensors by 
compromising some sensors. Thus, these schemes have a serious security problem. In the 
symmetric polynomial and/or Blom scheme, however, perfect security can be achieved but 
resource consumption is an issue. In this chapter, a key establishment protocol employing four 
key pre-distribution models for sensor networks with different requirements.   
In this chpate, we propose a new key establishment protocol called HKey. In this protocol, 
both efficient resource consumption and perfect security are the goals this protocol. The 
approach is similar to that of the basic scheme where every pair of sensors has a unique 
common key. In the proposed protocol, each sensor has a secret key and a unique identity. The 
common key between two sensors is generated using the secret key of one node and the 
identity of the other. This key is stored only in the latter node. For example, suppose sensors A 
and B want to generate a common key. Before deployment, the key distribution center (KDC) 
generates a key, for example, using the secret key of A and the identity of B, and stores this key 
only in B. When these sensors want to establish a common key, sensor A can generate the key 
with its own secret key and the identity of B. Sensor B just retrieves this key from its memory. 
Hence the memory usage in the proposed scheme is half that of the basic scheme.  
In HKey, we propose several different models based on the WSN requirements. In some of 
these models, the aim is low memory consumption in the sensors. In others, network 
connectivity and memory usage are equally important. In the last model, the goal is high 
connectivity. The models are deterministic, so every sensor knows whether or not it can 
establish a direct common key with another sensor. Since, every pairwise key between two 
sensors is unique, the security of the protocols is perfect. Also, it this protocol, only one node 
needs to store a common key, the common key can be generated between a new node and 
an old one based on the proposed protocol and the key stored in the new node. Therefore, 
this protocol is scalable. As we will show, this protocol is efficient in comparison other 
proposed protocols.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some required primitives 
including related work. Details of our key establishment protocol are discussed in Section 3. 
Performance evaluation and security analysis of the proposed protocol are presented in 
Section 4. Finally, some conclusions are given in Section 5. 
2. Background  
Most of the proposed key establishment protocols in WSNs are based on random key pre-
distribution, symmetric polynomials and/or the Blom scheme. In this section, we review 
some well known protocols based on these techniques. 
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2.1 Key establishment protocols based on random key pre-distribution 
Eschenauer et al. [Eschenauer & Gligor, 2002] proposed a random key pre-distribution 
scheme for WSNs. In this approach, before deployment some keys from a large key pool are 
selected randomly and stored in the sensors. After deployment in the network, a pair of 
nodes may have a shared common key to establish a secure connection. If there is no 
common key between two sensors, they have to establish a key through an intermediate 
sensor node which has common keys with both sensors. In this method, there is a tradeoff 
between connectivity and security. Network connectivity is determined from the probability 
of direct key generation between two adjacent sensors. As the size of the key pool increases, 
connectivity decreases, but protocol security increases. Due to the distribution of random 
keys, it may not be possible to establish a common key between every pair of sensors.  
Du et al. [Du, 2004] proposed a deployment knowledge key management protocol (denoted 
Du-1), based on the approach in [Eschenauer & Gligor, 2002]. In this case, deployment 
knowledge is modeled using a Gaussian probability distribution function (pdf).  Methods 
which do not use deployment knowledge such as in [Eschenauer & Gligor, 2002], assume a 
uniform pdf for the node distribution in the network. In this case, sensors can reside 
anywhere in the network with equal probability. In [Du, 2004], the network area is divided 
into square cells and each cell corresponds to one group of sensors. The key pool is divided 
into sub key pools of size S, one for each cell, such that each sub key pool has some 
correlated keys with its neighboring sub key pools. Each sub key pool has Sc common 
keys with the horizontal and vertical neighboring sub key pools, and Sc  common keys 
with the diagonal neighboring sub key pools, such that 4 4 1   , with   . Each 
sensor in a cell randomly selects mR keys from its associated sub key pool. 
2.2 Key establishment protocols based on symmetric polynomials 
A symmetric polynomial [Borwein & Erde´lyi, 1995; Zhou & Fang, Apr. 2006; Zhou & Fang, 
Oct. 2006] is a t-degree (K+1)-variate polynomial defined as follows 
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All coefficients of the polynomial are chosen from a finite field Fq, where q is a prime 
integer. The polynomial f is a symmetric polynomial so that [Zhou & Fang, Apr. 2006] 
 1 2 1 (1) (2) ( 1)( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., )K Kf x x x f x x x      (2) 
where   denotes a permutation. Every node using the symmetric polynomial based 
protocol takes K credentials (I1,I2,…,IK) from the key management center, and these are 
stored in memory. The key management center must also compute the polynomial shares 
using the node credentials and the symmetric polynomial. The coefficients bi  stored in node 
memory as the polynomial share are computed as follows 
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Every pair of nodes with only one mismatch in their identities can establish a shared key. 
Suppose the identities of nodes u and v have one mismatch in their identities (c1,c2,…,ci-
1,ui,ci+1,…,cK) and (c1,c2,…,ci-1,vi,ci+1,…,cK), respectively. In order to compute a shared key, 
node u takes vi as the input and computes fu(vi), and node v takes ui as the input and 
computes fv(ui). Due to the polynomial symmetry, both nodes compute the same shared key. 
In [Zhou & Fang, Apr. 2006] it was shown that in order to maintain perfect security in the 
WSN, the polynomial degree must satisfy 
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 where Ni is the number of nodes in group i. 
Zhou et al. [Zhou & Fang, Apr. 2007] proposed another key management protocol named 
LAKE which is based on symmetric polynomials and deployment knowledge. In this 
scheme, the network is also divided into square cells and each cell is allocated to one group 
of sensors. A t-degree tri-variate symmetric polynomial is employed. Each sensor in this 
protocol has credentials (n1, n2), where n1 and n2 represent the cell identity and the sensor 
identity, respectively. According to Section 2-1, the sensor polynomial share is calculated 
and stored in the sensor. After deployment, sensors that have one mismatch in their 
credentials can directly compute a shared key.  
Lin et al. [Liu & Ning, 2003] proposed another key management protocol called LPBK in 
which the network area is divided into square cells. Each cell has a specific symmetric 
polynomial which is used to compute the polynomial share for the sensors in the 
corresponding cell and four adjacent vertical and horizontal cells. Therefore, each sensor 
must store five polynomial shares in its memory. Then each sensor can directly compute a 
common key with the sensors in these five cells. 
We proposed a key establishment protocol for large scale sensor networks based on both 
symmetric polynomials and random key pre-distribution called HKEP [Fanian et. al., Apr 
2010]. In HKEP, both symmetric polynomials and random key pre-distribution are used to 
improve efficiency. In this scheme, key information is distributed to the sensors during the 
pre-deployment stage. Once the sensors have been deployed, they can produce a common key 
either directly or indirectly. Due to the use of two methods in HKEP, two types of information 
must be stored in the sensors. One is the sensor polynomial shares generated using the 
symmetric polynomials and finite projective plan, while the other is a set of random keys. 
Finite projective plane is a subset of symmetric BIBDs. There are two types of key generation 
in HKEP. In the first type, a common key between near sensors is generated via their 
polynomial shares. The polynomial shares for each sensor are distributed by a finite projective 
plan which is a symmetric design discus in combinatorial design theory. In the second type, a 
common key between far sensors is generated using the pre-distributed random keys. Since in 
this case a key may be selected by several sensors, the common key between two far sensors 
may also be used by other pairs of sensors.  Conversely, the common key between near 
sensors is unique. As we will show, the proposed end to end key establishment protocol 
between every pair of sensors can be supported without significant overhead. 
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Another proposed key establishment protocol, called SKEP, is based on symmetric 
polynomial [Fanian et. al., 2011]. In SKEP, the network area is divided into non-overlapping 
hexagonal cells, and the sensors are allocated in groups to these cells. The center of a cell is 
defined as the deployment point of the sensors allocated to that cell. In SKEP, each cell has a 
distinct t-degree bi-variate symmetric polynomial given by  
݂ሺݔଵ, ݔଶሻ = ෍ ෍ܽ௜భ,௜మݔଵ௜భݔଶ௜ଶ௧௜మసబ௧௜భୀ଴  
Each sensor has a triplet of credentials, (i,j,k). The first two credentials specify the 
deployment point of the sensor, while the last uniquely identifies each sensor in the cell. The 
polynomial share of a sensor,	 ௞݂ሺݔሻ, can be computed from the symmetric polynomial 
assigned to cell C(i,j) and the sensor credential k as follows 
௜݂ሺݔଶሻ = ௜݂ሺܣ, ݔଶሻ = ∑ ∑ ܽ௜భ,௜మܣ௜భݔଶ௜ଶ௧௜మୀ଴௧௜భୀ଴ =∑ ܾ௜మ,஺ݔଶ௜ଶ௧௜మୀ଴   , ܾ௜మ,஺ =෍ ܽ௜భ,௜మܣ௜భ௧௜భୀ଴  
If the polynomial share of two sensors is generated from the same symmetric polynomial, 
these sensors can create a common key by exchanging their credentials. Before distributing 
sensors in the network, the secret information is placed in the sensors. Given the sensor 
distribution in the network, some sensors in neighboring cells or even non-neighboring cells 
can be adjacent to each other. In order to connect to the network, these sensors must be able 
to generate a common key. Therefore, some correlated secret information should be given to 
these sensors in order to generate this key. However, this should not consume a significant 
amount of sensor memory. To meet this requirement, SKEP generates a polynomial share 
from the symmetric polynomial allocated to each cell for a portion of the sensors in 
neighboring cells. The sensors containing this additional polynomial share can operate as 
agent nodes to indirectly generate common keys between sensors in neighboring cells. In 
order to generate this additional polynomial share, we divide each hexagonal cell into six 
virtual regions. The division of cell (i,j) into virtual regions is shown in figure 1.  
 
Fig. 1. Dividing each cell into six virtual regions. 
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Each sensor will belong to one of these virtual regions according to its credential. After 
deployment, a sensor may not reside in the virtual region it is allocated to. However, each 
sensor can infer adjacent sensors which have a suitable polynomial share, and can also find 
suitable agents to generate an indirect common key with the other sensors. As mentioned 
previously, each sensor has three credential (i,j,k), so two sensors can easily verify whether 
they are in a common group via their credentials. 
2.3 Key establishment protocols based on blom’s scheme 
Blom proposed a key establishment protocol that allows each pair of nodes to establish a 
common key [Blom, 1985]. In this method, if no more than t nodes are compromised, the 
link between non-compromised nodes will remain secure. We refer to this as a t-secure 
method. To guarantee perfect security in a network with N nodes, an (N-2)-secure Blom 
scheme should be used. In the initialization phase, the key management center constructs a 
( 1)t N  matrix G over a finite field Fq, where N is the size of the network and q is a large 
prime. The matrix G is known by all nodes. Then the center constructs a random 
( 1) ( 1)t t    symmetric matrix D over GF(q), and an ( 1)N t  matrix ( )TP D G  , where T 
denotes transpose. The matrix D is kept secret in the center and is not revealed to any user. 
If D is symmetric, then K P G  is also symmetric since 
 ( ) ( )T T T T T T TK P G D G G G D G G D G G P P G                (5) 
Therefore, ijK is equal to jiK , where ijK is the element in the ith row and jth column of K. In 
the Blom scheme, ijK is used as a secret key between the ith and jth sensors. To generate this 
common key, the key management center assigns the ith row of P and ith column of G to 
user i, i = 1, 2, …, N. When nodes i and j want to establish a common key, they first exchange 
their columns of G. Then they can compute ijK and jiK , respectively, using their private row 
of P according to 
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 (6) 
As mentioned previously, G is public information, so the nodes can freely transmit their 
columns of G. It has been shown that if any t+1 columns of G are linearly independent then 
the Blom scheme is t-secure [Blom, 1985]. In this scheme, each sensor must store a row of P 
and a column of G. Therefore, the memory required is 2t+2. However, the structure of G can 
be exploited to reduce this memory requirement [Zhou et. al., 2005].  
Du [Du et. al., 2006] proposed another key management protocol (denoted Du-2) using 
the Blom scheme. In this case, many pairs of matrices G and D, called the key spaces, are 
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produced, and some key spaces are assigned to each cell. Adjacent cells have some 
common key space as in [Du, 2004], where adjacent cells have correlation between their 
sub key pools. Each sensor selects   key spaces randomly, and according to the Blom 
scheme, the required information is stored in the sensors. As a result, sensors with a 
common key space can produce a common key. As in [Du, 2004], two vertical or 
horizontal neighboring cells have Sc common key spaces, and two diagonal neighboring 
cells have Sc common key spaces, where Sc is the number of key spaces assigned to a 
cell.   
Yu and Guan [Yu & Guan, 2008] also proposed a key management protocol based on the 
Blom scheme. In this protocol, the network area is divided into hexagonal cells and 
information on the associated matrices is stored in the sensors based on deployment 
knowledge. The matrices are assigned to the cells such that a confidential exclusive 
matrix, denoted Ai (equivalent to matrix D in the Blom method), is allocated to cell i. The 
sensors in a cell, according to their identities, take a row from the corresponding matrix so 
they can produce a common key directly. To generate a common key between sensors 
belonging to different cells, another confidential matrix B is employed. The B matrices are 
allocated to the cells based on two parameters b and w, where b is the number of matrices 
allocated to a group, and w is the number of rows selected by each sensor from these 
matrices. The analysis in [Yu & Guan, 2008] shows that the best results are obtained with 
w=2 and b=2. In this approach, the cells are divided into two categories, base cells and 
normal cells. Base cells are not neighbors, but normal cells are neighbors with two base 
cells. To produce a common key between sensors in neighboring cells, a confidential 
matrix B is allocated to each base cell together with its six neighbors. Using the Blom 
scheme with this matrix, the necessary information is stored in the sensors. Then the 
sensors in the seven neighboring cells can produce a common key directly. Since each 
normal cell is a neighbor with two base cells, normal cell sensors receive information from 
two B matrices. Although the connectivity of this scheme is close to one, the memory 
consumption is extremely high. 
We proposed another key establishment protocol for low resource wireless sensor 
networks based on the Blom scheme and random key pre-distribution called KELR 
[Fanian et. al., May 2010]. In this protocol, the Blom scheme is used to establish common 
keys between sensors in a cell. Therefore, the key distribution center constructs distinct 
matrices Gi,j and Di,j for each cell C(i,j). Each sensor has a triplet of credentials (i,j,k). The 
first two credentials specify the deployment point of the sensor and the last is the unique 
ID of the sensor in the cell. The center uses this unique identifier to construct Gi,j. Since the 
sensors belonging to a cell use the same matrix Di,j, they can directly generate a common 
key. 
Given the sensor distribution in the network, some sensors belonging to neighboring cells or 
even non-neighboring cells can be deployed adjacent to each other. In order to connect the 
network, these sensors should be able to generate a common key, so secret information must 
be allocated to enable this. However, this should not consume a lot of memory. To meet this 
requirement, KELR employs random key pre-distribution. We could also use the Blom 
scheme to establish common keys among sensors in neighboring cells, but this would result 
in high memory consumption.  
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3. The new key establishment protocol  
Nodes are typically mobile in ad-hoc networks while in sensor networks they are assumed 
to be static after deployment. Therefore, deployment knowledge can be quite useful in 
producing common keys among sensors. In addition, in most WSN applications, a secure 
peer-to-peer connection between remote sensors is unnecessary [Chan et. al., 2003-Fanian 
et.al, May 2010]. Therefore, the main goal is establishing secure connections between 
adjacent sensors, so knowledge of probable neighbors can be beneficial in key pre-
distribution. In fact, if one can predict the adjacency of sensors in the network, a key 
management protocol can be developed with high efficiency and low cost. However, due to 
the inherent randomness of sensor distribution, it is impossible to specify the exact location 
of each sensor; knowing the probable neighbors is much more realistic. Deployment 
knowledge is exploited to generate key material in the pre-deployment phase. We first 
present our key pre-distribution protocol and then consider its use with different models.  
3.1 The new key pre-distribution protocol 
As mentioned in Section 2, most key establishment protocols are based on symmetric 
polynomials, the Blom scheme and/or random key pre-distribution [Chan et. al., 2003-Fanian 
et.al, May 2010]. In this section, a High performance Key establishment protocol, HKey, is 
proposed which is not based on these techniques. The goal of this new protocol is efficient 
resource consumptions and perfect security. The approach is similar to that of the basic scheme 
where every pair of sensors has a unique common key. As mentioned in Section 1, in this case a 
distinct key must be generated and stored for every pair of sensors, so memory consumption 
will be excessive in a large scale WSN. Thus while this scheme is quite simple, it has poor 
scalability. The goal with HKey is to retain the simplicity of the basic scheme while providing 
scalability and memory efficiency. In the proposed protocol, each sensor has a secret key and a 
unique identity. The common key between two sensors is generated using the secret key of one 
node and the identity of the other. This key is stored only in the latter node. For example, 
suppose sensors A and B want to generate a common key. Before deployment, the key 
distribution center (KDC) generates a key, for example, using the secret key of A and the 
identity of B, and stores this key only in B. When these sensors want to establish a common key, 
sensor A can generate the key with its own secret key and the identity of B. Sensor B just 
retrieves this key from its memory. Hence the memory usage in the proposed scheme is half 
that of the basic scheme.  
In a group of Ng sensors, each sensor must store / 2Ng  keys to establish a secure 
connection with all sensors in the group. To generate common keys, the KDC establishes a 
key map matrix. This map is an Ng×Ng matrix which determines whether the secret key or 
the identity of the corresponding sensor is used to generate the common key. The KDC may 
generate the key map randomly such that the memory usage for each sensor is not more 
than
1
2
Ng     . In Table 1 the key map for a group of 8 sensors is shown. We assume the 
sensor identities are 1 to 8. In Table 1, ‘√’	 in location (i,j) indicates that the common key 
between sensors i and j is generated by the secret key of the jth sensor and the identity of the 
ith sensor, so the key must be stored in the ith sensor. Conversely,  ‘–‘ indicates that the 
common key between sensors i and j is generated from the secret key of the ith sensor and 
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the identity of the jth sensor, so the key must be stored in the jth sensor. Each sensor stores a 
maximum of only 4 keys.  
 
Sensor Identity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 × – √ – √ – √ – 
2 √ × – √ – √ – √ 
3 – √ × – √ – √ – 
4 √ – √ × – √ – √ 
5 – √ – √ × – √ – 
6 √ – √ – √ × – √ 
7 – √ – √ – √ × – 
8 √ – √ – √ – √ × 
Table 1. Key Map for a Group with 8 Sensors 
The common keys are generated based on the key map generated in the pre-deployment 
phase. As mentioned previously, each sensor has a unique identity which is a number 
between 1 and Ng. To generate the common key Kij, the KDC uses a one-way hash function 
with the secret Si and identity Nj as follows  
( || )ij i jK H S N
  
Unlike the basic scheme, the proposed protocol is scalable. In the basic scheme, since 
deployed nodes do not have a common key with a new node, they cannot establish a 
secure connection. In the proposed protocol, since only one node needs to store a common 
key, it can be generated between a new node and an old one based on the proposed 
protocol and the key stored in the new node. Therefore, all nodes can establish a secure 
connection.     
3.2 Network and deployment model 
In HKey, the network area is divided into non-overlapping hexagonal cells, and the sensors 
are allocated in groups to these cells. The center of a cell is defined as the deployment point 
of the sensors allocated to that cell. Figure 2 shows the division of the network into 
hexagonal cells. Each cell in HKey has a pair of credentials (i,j) which is the cell  position. 
Using two-dimensional Cartesian coordinates and assuming that the deployment point of 
cell C(i,j) is (xi,yi), the pdf of the sensor resident points is 
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 (7) 
And  is the standard deviation. Assuming identical pdfs for all group of sensors, we can use 
( , | ( , ))kf x y k C i j  instead of ( , ( , ))ijkf x y k C i j . As in [Liu & Ning, 2003-Du, 2006], in HKey it 
is assumed that the routing protocol delivers transmitted data to the correct destinations. A 
typical distribution for the sensors belonging to cell C(1,2) is shown in figure 2. 
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Fig. 2. A sensor network with distance L between adjacent deployment points. The center of 
each cell is defined as the deployment point. 
3.3 Pre-distribution of secret information 
The secret information for generating a common key should be produced before 
deployment. As mentioned in Section 3-1, in the proposed protocol, each sensor has a secret 
key, a unique identity, and some common keys with other sensors stored in its memory. In 
HKey, each sensor is able to establish a common key with any sensor in the same cell. If only 
common keys between sensors in a cell are generated, adjacent sensors belonging to 
different cells will not be able to establish a secure connection. Since sensor deployment 
follows a Gaussian distribution, it may be that two sensors from neighboring cells are 
adjacent to each other. Thus some sensors must be able to establish a common key with 
sensors in neighboring cells. For this purpose, in HKey the pre-distributed common keys are 
generated in two phases. In the first phase, the KDC generates the common keys for sensors 
belonging to a cell based on the proposed protocol in Section 3-1. In the second phase, 
common keys are distributed so that some sensors belonging to neighboring cells can 
establish a direct common key. 
The percentage of sensors that have second phase keys has a great influence on network 
connectivity and memory consumption. Thus in HKey, we propose several different models 
based on the WSN requirements. In some of these models, the aim is low memory 
consumption in the sensors. In others, network connectivity and memory usage are equally 
important. In the last model, the goal is high connectivity. The models are deterministic, so 
every sensor knows whether or not it can establish a direct common key with another 
sensor. In figure 3, the four models are depicted.  
First, a Low Resource consumption (HKey-LR) model is proposed for very low resource 
sensors. In HKey-LR, each cell is divided into two virtual regions. Virtual regions are also 
used in some of the other proposed models. In this case, cells are divided into regions, and 
in the pre-deployment stage each sensor in a cell is assigned to one of these regions. For 
example, if a cell with Nc sensors is divided into two virtual regions, as shown in figure 3(a), 
sensors with identities from 1 to Nc/2 are assigned to the first virtual region, and the 
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remainder to the second region. After deployment, a sensor may not reside in their virtual 
region. However, during the key generation process, each sensor will know which adjacent 
sensors they can establish a common key with. In HKey-LR, a group consists of virtual 
regions from three neighboring cells. In figure 3(a), the network is divided into triangular 
areas. In Phase 2, the common keys are generated based on the proposed scheme with a 
small change. Since common keys among sensors belonging to a cell are generated in Phase 
1, we should not produce any more of these keys in Phase 2. Therefore, in the second phase, 
the KDC only generates common keys among sensors in a group which belong to different 
cells. For instance, suppose each cell has 6 sensors, so a group has 9 sensors from three 
neighboring cells. Assume these sensors are A1, A2, A3 in cell A, B1, B2, B3 in cell B, and C1, C2, 
C3 in cell C.  The common keys among sensors in this group are shown in Table 2. In this 
Table, Kij is the common key between sensors i and j generated using the secret key of sensor 
i and the identity of sensor j.  
 
C3 C2 C1B3B2 B1A3A2A1 
KA1-C3 KA1-C2 KA1-C1 KC1-B3KC1-B2KC1-B1KB1-A3 KB1-A2KB1-A1 
KA2-C3 KA2-C2 KA2-C1 KC2-B3KC2-B2KC2-B1KB2-A3KB2-A2KB2-A1 
KA3-C3 KA3-C2 KA3-C1 KC3-B3 KC3-B2 KC3-B1 KB3-A3 KB3-A2 KB3-A1 
Table 2. Common Keys Generated in Phase 2 
Second, a Medium Resource consumption (HKey-MR) model is proposed for low resource 
sensors. Cells in HKey-MR are divided into two types called base cells and normal cells. 
As shown in figure 3(b), cells C(i,j) and C(i+1,j+2) are base cells. Note that base cells are 
not neighbors of each other. Each normal cell is the neighbor of two base cells, and is 
divided into two virtual regions. A group consists of a base cell and virtual regions in the 
six neighboring cells. Each virtual region belongs to one group. The common keys among 
sensors belonging to different cells in a group are generated in Phase 2. 
Third, an Advanced Medium Resource consumption (HKey-AMR) model is proposed. In 
HKey-AMR, as shown in figure 3(c), the network cells are divided into even and odd rows. 
Each cell located in an odd row is divided into two virtual regions. In this model each cell 
along with its six neighboring cells establishes a group. Each cell along with its neighboring 
cell that is in the same row establishes one group. In other words, the sensors in cell C(i,j) 
belong to a distinct group with the sensors in cell C(i-1,j) and also to a group with the 
sensors in cell C(i+1,j), for j even or odd. If a cell is located in an even row, it will establish 
four distinct groups with neighboring cells located in odd rows. In figure 3(c), C(i,j) is in an 
even row, so its sensors along with the sensors belonging to a virtual region of cells C(i,j+1), 
C(i+1,j+1), C(i-1,j-1) and C(i,j-1) establish four distinct groups. Common keys among sensors 
belonging to different cells in the groups are generated according to Phase 2 of the proposed 
protocol. 
Finally, a High Performance (HKey-HP) model is proposed. In HKey-HP, similar to HKey-
MR, the cells are divided into normal cells and base cells. Each group consists of one base 
cell and two neighboring normal cells, as shown in figure 3(d) for cell C(i,j). In this case, 
each cell is a member of three groups. The common keys among sensors within groups are 
generated in Phase 2. 
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Fig. 3. The proposed key distribution models. a) Low Resource consumption (HKey-LR) b) 
Medium Resource consumption (HKey-MR) c) Advanced Medium Resource consumption 
(HKey-AMR) d) High Performance  (HKey-HP). In a), b) and c), half of cell (i,j+1) is a virtual 
region. In b) cells (i,j) and (i+1,j+2) are base cells and their neighbors are normal cells. The 
shading denotes a group. 
3.4 Direct key calculation 
In the four proposed models, two sensors belonging to a cell can establish a shared key 
directly. If they do not belong to the same cell, they may be located in a common group. 
Based on the model employed, the sensors can easily determine if they are in the same 
group or not. Sensors in a group can also establish a common key directly. 
3.5 Indirect key calculation 
Considering the Gaussian distribution for sensor deployment, sensors in two distinct groups 
may be adjacent to each other. In this case, they cannot generate a common key directly and 
suitable agents must be found. A proper agent node is one that can generate common keys 
directly with both sensors. Since a number of sensors in two neighboring cells can directly 
generate common keys with sensors in both cells, at most two agent nodes suffice to 
generate a common key between any two adjacent sensors that cannot establish a common 
www.intechopen.com
 Key Establishment Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks 181 
key directly. If the distance between sensor deployment points is large, establishing a 
common key between them may require several agents. Note that if the resident point 
distance between agents is less than the wireless transmission range, they can communicate 
with each other directly; otherwise, a routing protocol is needed to connect them such as in 
[Du, 2004 - Yu & Guan, 2008].  The performance and security of indirect common key 
generation is greatly affected by the number of agent nodes. In HKey, the number of usable 
agents is typically high to ensure efficient key generation. 
4. Security analysis and performance evaluation 
In this section the security analysis and performance evaluation of the proposed protocol are 
presented and compared with similar protocols including Du-1 [Du, 2004], LAKE [Zhou & 
Fang, Apr. 2007], LPBK [Liu & Ning, 2003], Du-2 [Du et. al., 2006] and Yu and Guan [Yu & 
Guan, 2008]. Using the threat model in [Su et. al, 2010], we assume that an adversary can 
obtain all secret information from compromised sensors, and their goal is to obtain the 
common keys between non-compromised sensors. An adversary may be an insider or 
outsider. An outsider does not have any prior information about the network or the 
relationship between sensors. In contrast, an insider can have significant information about 
the network such as the deployment model, sensor groups, etc., and thus may know which 
sensors can establish a common key with a given sensor directly. This information is very 
useful for some attacks such as network discovery, false route injection, common key 
compromising, etc [Su et. al, 2010]. Nevertheless, when the common key between every pair 
of sensors is distinct and independent from any other keys such as in the basic scheme and 
the proposed protocol, a brute-force attack is the only option for an adversary 
(insider/outsider) to compromise common keys. In other words, additional information 
about the sensors and the network does not help in finding a common key between two 
non-compromised sensors. Unlike the basic scheme and our proposed protocol, with the 
other protocols based on random key pre-distribution, the Blom scheme and/or symmetric 
polynomials, insider information can be exploited to compromise the common key between 
non-compromised sensors. The adversary is assumed to be an outsider who compromises 
sensor nodes randomly. 
4.1 Network configuration 
We consider a WSN with the following parameters similar to those in [Du et. al., 2006]: 
 The number of sensors in the network is 10,000. 
 The network area is 1000 1000m m . 
 Sensors have a two dimensional Gaussian distribution with standard deviation 
50 m  . 
 The number of sensors in each cell is 100. 
 The wireless transmission range is 40 m. 
4.2 Local connectivity 
Local connectivity is defined as the probability of direct key generation between two 
adjacent sensors. Each sensor can establish a common key with some adjacent sensors 
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directly, and with other adjacent sensors indirectly. Three parameters are most relevant to 
the local connectivity. The first is the sensor distribution, which can be uniform or non-
uniform. With a uniform distribution, each sensor may reside anywhere in the network. 
Since the available memory for each sensor is restricted, each sensor can establish a common 
key with a limited number of sensors. Therefore in this situation the local connectivity is 
often low [Eschenauer & Gligor, 2002]. With a non-uniform distribution (typically 
Gaussian), there is a greater chance that two adjacent sensors are members of the same cell 
or group. Thus in this case the local connectivity can be much higher. The second parameter 
is the shape and size of the groups. This influences how the correlated key information is 
distributed among sensors in neighboring cells. The last parameter is the average number of 
accessible sensors for each sensor. This is related to the sensor wireless transmission range 
and the density of the sensor distribution. 
In this section, we use deployment knowledge to distribute secret information to the 
sensors. We compare our proposed models with those given above using the specified 
network parameters. In the scheme in [Du, 2004], each cell has a sub key pool with S keys, 
and there are some common keys between neighboring cell sub key pools. As mentioned in 
Section 2-3, the two horizontal or vertical neighboring cell sub key pools have S common 
keys, and the two diagonal neighboring cells have S common keys. The probability of 
common key establishment between two sensors in a cell with this technique is 
 1C
S m
m
P
S
m
        
 (8) 
where m is the number of keys in each sensor. The sub key pools of two neighboring cells 
have S  shared keys where   is equal to   for horizontal or vertical neighboring cells and 
  for the other neighboring cells. Two sensors belonging to neighboring cells can establish 
a common key if they select at least one common key from the shared keys in their sub key 
pools. The probability of having i common keys for these sensors is 
2 2
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          
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The probability of common key establishment between two sensors belonging to 
neighboring cells is then 
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   
  (9) 
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With the approach in [Du et. al., 2006], Sc key spaces are assigned to a cell, where each key 
space is a Blom matrix. Similar to [Du, 2004], two neighboring cell key spaces have some 
common matrices. In this scheme each sensor selects  matrices from the corresponding key 
spaces. Thus the probability of establishing a common key between two adjacent sensors 
can be computed similar to (8) and (9).  
In LAKE, a tri-variate t-degree symmetric polynomial is used to generate a polynomial share 
for each sensor. With this scheme, every pair of sensors belonging to a cell can establish a 
common key, but only one sensor belonging to each cell can establish a direct key with a 
given sensor in another cell. In LPBK and the approach of Yu and Guan [Yu & Guan, 2008], 
two adjacent sensors belonging to a cell or neighboring cells can establish a direct common 
key.  
In the proposed models, every pair of sensors belonging to a cell can establish a direct 
common key. However, only some sensors belonging to neighboring cells can establish a 
direct common key. In HKey-LR the probability of establishing a common key for these 
sensors is 1/6. In HKey-MR, if one sensor is in a base cell and another is in a neighboring 
normal cell, the probability is 0.5. If the sensors are in different normal cells around a base 
cell, the probability of a common key existing is 0.25. In HKey-AMR, every pair of sensors 
belonging to neighboring cells in the same row can establish a common key directly. 
However, the probability for nodes belonging to other neighboring cells is 0.5. In HKey-HP, 
every pair of sensors belonging to neighboring cells can establish a direct common key. 
We simulated the local connectivity of the techniques considered, and the results are given 
in figure 5. Our simulation program was developed using the C++ language in the Visual 
Studio .Net environment. This table shows that HKey-LR has lower local connectivity 
compared to the other proposed models.  However, as we will discuss in the next section, 
the memory usage with this model is lower than with the others. The local connectivity with 
LAKE is less than the other schemes. Moreover, the local connectivity for HKey-HP, the 
approach by Yu and Guan [Yu & Guan, 2008], and LPKB are approximately equal to one. 
However as we will show, the memory usage in our proposed model is lower compared to 
these schemes. In the simulations, we assumed 15%   and 10%   for the approaches in 
[Du, 2004] and [Du et. al., 2006]. 
4.3 Memory usage 
Memory in sensors is often very restricted, so the key establishment protocol should use 
memory efficiently. In this section, the memory usage is determined for the proposed 
HKey models and the other schemes considering perfect security. With perfect security, 
an adversary who wants to compromise the common key between two non-compromised 
sensors cannot do better than a brute-force attack or capturing at least one of these 
sensors. To achieve perfect security when symmetric polynomials are used, the 
polynomial degree, t, must satisfy (4). The Blom scheme is a t-secure scheme, so that if no 
more than t nodes are compromised, the link between non-compromised nodes will 
remain secure. In this case, t specifies the size of the Blom matrix and memory usage. 
Since in our protocol the common keys among sensors are generated using their secret 
keys, it intrinsically has perfect security.  
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Fig. 4. Comparison of Local Connectivity with Different Techniques 
4.3.1 Memory usage for HKey-LR 
In HKey-LR, as shown in figure 3(a), each cell is divided into two virtual regions. In this 
model, a group consists of virtual regions from three neighboring cells. In Phase 2, only the 
common keys for sensors belonging to different cells are generated. The total memory usage 
comprises that required for keys generated in Phase 1 (MLR,1) and Phase 2 (MLR,2). As 
mentioned previously, in Phase 1 the KDC generates common keys for all sensors in a cell. If 
the number of sensors in a cell is Nc, the memory usage for each sensor in this phase will be 
2
CN    . In Phase 2, the KDC generates common keys for the groups. Since there are different 
regions in a group, the KDC generates common keys for the pairs of regions in the group. 
As shown in figure 3(a), there are three virtual regions in a group each from a neighboring 
cell. Let the virtual regions in a group be v1, v2, and v3. In Phase 2, the KDC generates 
common keys among sensors in pairs (v1, v2), (v1, v3), and (v2, v3) independently such that the 
memory usage for all sensors is similar. If the number of sensors in v1, v2, and v3 is n1, n2, and 
n3, respectively, the number of common keys among sensors in (vi, vj) is ni×nj. These keys 
must be distributed among ni+nj sensors. In HKey-LR, since each virtual region has Nc/2 
sensors, the number of common keys for every pair of virtual regions is 2 4Nc . Since the 
number of sensors in each region is identical and the group structure is the same, the 
number of common keys distributed to the sensors in every pair of regions is the same. 
Therefore each sensor in the pair (vi, vj) must store 4Nc  keys out of 
2 4Nc keys. As a result, 
the memory usage for this model is  
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4.3.2 Memory usage for HKey-MR 
In HKey-MR, as shown in figure 3(b), cells are divided into base cells and normal cells, and 
each normal cell is divided into two virtual regions. Each group consists of a base cell (v1) 
and six virtual regions from neighboring cells (v2 to v7). Unlike HKey-LR, in HKey-MR the 
size of the regions is not equal.  Although the number of sensors in six regions of a group is 
identical, the number of sensors in one region of that group is different. The KDC should 
generate and distribute common keys such that the memory usage for all sensors is close to 
identical. In this model, the number of sensors in v1 is Nc and in the other regions is Nc/2. 
Thus, the number of common keys between v1 and vi (i = 2, 3, ..., 7) is 
2 2Nc and the number 
of common keys between vi and vj (i,j : 2, 3, ..., 7) is 
2 4Nc . To balance the memory usage, we 
assume fractions   and   of the common keys are stored in v1 and vi , i = 2, 3, ..., 7, 
respectively. Since the sensors in v1 have common keys with all sensors in v2, v3, …, v7, the 
memory usage for each sensor in v1 is 3 Nc  in Phase 2. On the other hand, the common 
keys for the other regions can be equally distributed among them. Therefore, each sensor in 
vi (i = 2, 3, ..., 7) has Nc  common keys with v1 and 4Nc common keys with vj (j=2, 3, ..., 7,
i j ), so that in total there are 5 4Nc Nc  keys in Phase 2. To ensure the same memory 
usage for all sensors,  and  must satisfy  
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Therefore, the memory usage for HKey-MR is 
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4.3.3 Memory usage for HKey-AMR 
In HKey-AMR, as shown in figure 3(c), each cell and its neighboring cells establish six 
distinct groups. As described in Section 3-3, each cell constructs a group with each of its 
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neighboring cells in the same row. Since the groups are similar, the common keys are 
distributed equally among the sensors in the group. Therefore, the number of common keys 
which should be stored in each sensor is 2Nc . In addition, each cell located in an even row 
constructs four separate groups with the virtual regions located in neighboring cells in odd 
rows. In this case, the two regions have different sizes, and the number of common keys 
generated for each group is 2 2Nc . In order to use the same memory in all sensors, similar 
to HKey-MR, we assume fractions   and   of the keys are stored in the sensors of even 
row cells (full-cells) and virtual regions (half-cells). Therefore the number of common keys 
stored in each sensor belonging to full and half cells is 2Nc  and Nc , respectively. Each 
virtual region located in an odd row belongs to two groups with neighboring cells in an 
even row. Since each full cell constructs four distinct groups with four half cells, the Phase 2 
memory usage for a sensor belonging to an even row cell is 2Nc NC , and for a sensor 
belonging to an odd row cell is 2Nc NC . Thus 1 / 2    provides the required 
balanced memory usage in all sensors. The required memory for this model is then 
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4.3.4 Memory usage for HKey-HP 
In HKey-HP, as shown in figure 3(d), each group consists of regions of three neighboring cells, 
and each cell is in three groups. The common keys among sensors in different cells are 
generated in Phase 2. Since groups in this model have the same structure and population, the 
common keys are equally distributed among the sensors. If the number of sensors belonging to 
the neighboring cells is n1, n2 and n3, then the number of common keys generated in Phase 2 is 
1 2 1 3 2 3n n n n n n     . These keys must be equally distributed among 1 2 3n n n   sensors. 
Since the number of sensors in each cell is Nc, the memory usage for this model is 
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4.3.5 Memory usage for other schemes 
The memory usage for the other schemes is computed based on the perfect security 
condition. In LPBK, as mentioned previously, the key establishment protocol is based on 
symmetric polynomials. As shown in (4), in order to maintain perfect security the 
polynomial degree must be 2iN t  , where Ni is the number of polynomial shares 
generated from a symmetric polynomial. Therefore, Ni is equal to 5Nc. To satisfy (4), the 
degree, t, of each symmetric polynomial must be at least 5 2Nc  . From Section 2-2, each 
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sensor receives five polynomial shares from five distinct symmetric polynomials. Since each 
sensor polynomial share has t coefficients and each sensor has five polynomial shares, the 
memory usage for LPBK with perfect security is 5(5 2)Nc  . 
In LAKE, a tri-variate t-degree symmetric polynomial is used. In this scheme, each sensor 
can establish a direct common key with 2Nc nodes.  According to (4), to achieve perfect 
security the polynomial degree and thus memory usage must be at least 2 2Nc  .  
The key establishment protocols Du-2 [Du et. al., 2006] and Yu and Guan [Yu & Guan, 2008] are 
based on the Blom scheme. In this case, the KDC creates an ( 1)iN t  symmetric matrix. Each 
sensor stores a row of this matrix. As discussed in Section 2-3, the Blom scheme is t-secure if any 
subset with a maximum of t colluding sensors cannot compromise the common key between 
two other sensors. Therefore to achieve perfect security, the number of sensors which receive a 
row from the matrix must be less than t. With the approach in [Yu & Guan, 2008], in the best 
case, each base cell has six neighboring normal cells and each normal cell is the neighbor of two 
base cells. Then sensors in a base cell and the six neighboring normal cells have different rows 
from a Blom matrix, so t must be at least 7Nc. Each sensor in a normal cell receives two rows 
from two matrices corresponding to its two neighboring base cells, so the required memory 
with the approach in [Yu & Guan, 2008] is at least 14Nc. With the approach in [Du et. al., 2006], 
as stated in Section 2-3, each key space may exist in a maximum of two neighboring cells. 
Therefore, 2Nc sensors may select from the shared key space, so t must be at least 2Nc, and each 
sensor selects   key spaces from Sc spaces. The minimum value for   is one. As   increases, 
the memory usage and local connectivity (as shown in figure 4), also increases.  
With the approach in [Du, 2004], which is also based on random key pre-distribution, each 
sensor selects m keys from a sub key pool. In this scheme, perfect security is not possible. 
Based on the memory analysis above, Table 3 summarizes the required memory for each 
scheme. This table shows that the memory usage with HKey-LR and HKey-MR is less than 
with the other schemes. LAKE also has low memory consumption. Although the memory 
usage with LAKE is almost equal to that with HKey-MR, the corresponding local 
connectivity is only 0.3228 compared 0.5601. Among the schemes with local connectivity 
close to one, the memory required with HKey-HP is lowest.  
 
Scheme Memory cost 
Memory required to ensure secrecy 
of a direct key between sensors 
LAKE t+1 2 1Nc   
LPBK 5(t+1) 5(5 2)Nc   
Yu and Guan 2(t+1) 14 1cN   
Du-2 ( ( 1))O t   ( ( 1))O t   
SKEP 2(t+1) 4Nc-1
KELR t+1 Nc-1
HKey-LR - CN
HKey-MR - 2.2Nc
HKey- AMR - 2.5 CN  
HKey- HP - 3.5 CN  
Table 3. Memory Required with Different Schemes 
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4.4 Resilience against key exposure 
Since sensors are deployed in hostile environments and the sensor hardware may not be 
tamper proof, an adversary may be able to capture key information from one or more sensors. 
In some key management schemes, it is possible to obtain common keys between 
uncompromised sensors by compromising some sensors. In methods based on symmetric 
polynomials or the Blom scheme, as mentioned in Section 2, when an adversary compromises 
more than t sensors, access can be obtained to the common key of uncompromised sensors. 
Therefore, by proper selection of t, the probability of keys belonging to uncompromised 
sensors being compromised can be reduced to an acceptable level, or even 0. However, 
increasing t directly affects the sensor processing and memory overhead (as shown in Table 4), 
thus selecting a large value of t may not be practical. Hence, t should be chosen based on the 
tradeoff between memory/processing cost and the security level. Here, we assume that an 
adversary can uniformly capture sensors in the network. Let Ni be the number of sensors in 
each group. If an adversary can compromise the common key between two uncompromised 
sensors if at least t sensors from the group are compromised, then the probability of a direct 
common key between two sensors in the same group being compromised is 
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where X is the number of compromised sensors in the entire network and N is the number 
of sensors in the network. 
In [Du, 2004], each sensor selects mR keys from a sub key pool. An adversary can get more 
information about the sub key pool by compromising more sensors. In this scheme, each cell 
has a sub key pool with S keys, and each key exists in two neighboring sub key pools. Thus, 
the probability of compromising the key between two sensors that have a common key is 
 1 1
iX
Rm
S
      (16) 
where Xi is the number of compromised sensors in a group. Since there are two cells in a 
group, the probability of compromising XG sensors in a group when X sensors are 
compromised in the entire network is 
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 (17) 
where n is the number of cells in the network. Therefore the probability of compromising a 
common key based on the pre-distributed random key approach in [Du, 2004] is 
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In [Du et. al., 2006], each sensor selects   key spaces from Sc available key spaces, and each 
key space is a Blom matrix. The value of  is 1m t  , where m is the size of the available 
memory and t is the size of Blom matrix. Similar to [Du, 2004], each key space is shared 
between two neighboring cells and may be selected by 2Nc sensors. When t sensors having 
distinct rows of the same key space are compromised, the other common keys in the key 
space are also compromised. Therefore, assuming Xi sensors in a group are compromised, 
the probability of compromising a common key between uncompromised sensors is  
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Then the probability of compromising the common key between two uncompromised 
sensors when X sensors are compromised in the entire network is 
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Since, our proposed key establishment protocol is not based on symmetric polynomials 
or the Blom scheme, capturing some sensors has no impact on compromising the 
common keys between uncompromised sensors. Hence, in the proposed protocol, the 
probability of compromising a common key between two uncompromised sensors is 
zero. On the other hand, if the available sensor memory is less than that required to store 
the Phase 1 and 2 common keys, fewer keys can be stored without any impact on 
security. However, the local connectivity will be reduced. Thus HKey can be employed 
when there are memory restrictions. In contrast, with the schemes based on symmetric 
polynomials or the Blom scheme, each sensor in a group can generate a common key 
with all other sensors in that group, so there is no flexibility to accommodate memory 
restrictions. 
Using the above analysis, the probability of compromising a common key for all techniques 
except the proposed one was calculated and the results are shown in figure 5. Note that this 
probability is zero for all HKey models, so the security of our proposed models is not 
depicted. With Du-1 [Du, 2004], if the available memory increases, the number of selected 
random keys can be increased, but the security of this scheme based on (16) will be 
decreased. Conversely, techniques based on the Blom scheme or symmetric polynomials 
will have increased security according to (15). 
4.5 Computational overhead 
Key generation in HKey is based on symmetric cryptography. As mentioned in Section 3-
1, a one way hash function is used to generate a common key. For a given pair of sensors, 
one has the common key in memory, while the other can generate the common key using 
the hash function. Thus in HKey, key generation is done in only one node, and the other 
does not require any processing. To estimate the required processing in a sensor, we 
assume that the key length is 128 bits and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
algorithm is used.  
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Fig. 5. Key resilience with different protocols for available memory 200 keys for each sensor. 
In sensors, a low power microcontroller is typically used as the processing unit, so we 
assume that an 8-bit microcontroller from the 8051 family [www.atmel.com] is employed. 
As shown in [Nechavatal, 2000], AES has been implemented on this microcontroller using 
3168 instruction cycles. Since key generation between two sensors is done in only one node, 
the required processing in both sensors to establish a common key is approximately 1600 
instruction cycles on average, independent of network parameters. To compare with the 
other schemes, we have evaluated them assuming sufficient memory is available. LPBK and 
LAKE are based on symmetric polynomials, and if the polynomial has degree t, 2t modular 
multiplications and t summations are required. Since HKey uses a 128 bit key length, we 
assume these schemes use 128 bit modular arithmetic. To compute the modular 
multiplication of two 128 bit numbers, we use the interleaved modulo multiplication 
algorithm [Bunimov & Schimmler, 2004] which is implemented as follows 
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Our evaluation shows that the modular multiplication of two 128 bit numbers requires 
approximately 4096 instruction cycles. Hence, the number of instruction cycles is 
approximately 8300×t for LPBK and LAKE. The value of t in these schemes is not identical 
and is dependent on the group size. With the approach in [Yu & Guan, 2008], which uses the 
Blom scheme, multiplication of two matrices with dimensions (1,t+1) and (t+1,1) is required. 
For this operation, t+1 modular multiplications and t+1 summations are needed. Therefore, 
this scheme requires approximately 4096×t instruction cycles. The above results are 
summarized in Table 4 under the condition of perfect security.  
 
Average Number of 
Instruction Cycles per Sensor 
Required Threshold Value Scheme 
1600 - 
HKey (All models) 
with AES 
638 - 
HKey (All models) 
with MD5 
1.66×106 2Nc-2 SKEP 
0.86×106 Nc-2 KELR 
1.66×106 2Nc-2LAKE 
2.075×107 25Nc-10LPBK 
5.734×106 14Nc-2Yu and Guan 
Table 4. Computational Overhead for Different Schemes 
As mentioned above, generating a common key among sensors with HKey requires a hash 
function. Although functions such as MD5 or SHA1 are commonly used for this purpose, 
we use the AES encryption algorithm. Our reason for using this algorithm is that an 
algorithm must be implemented in the sensors to encrypt transferred data. Due to the 
restricted sensor code space, it is better to avoid implementing a hash function for key 
generation. However, as shown in [Venugopalan et. al., 2003], the number of instruction 
cycles for MD5 is less than for AES. If sufficient memory space is available in the sensors, 
the MD5 algorithm can easily be used in our protocol. In order to compare results, we 
extend our analysis to the MD5 hash function as shown in Table 4. 
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Since in our protocol, key establishment between two sensors is not based on symmetric 
polynomials or the Blom scheme as in LAKE, LPBK, and the approach in [Yu & Guan, 2008], 
the computational overhead does not depend on the network or cell size. Thus, the 
proposed scheme is clearly the best in terms of processing cost. 
4.6 Scalability 
Wireless sensor networks typically consist of thousands of limited resource nodes which are 
deployed simultaneously in a network area. Since each sensor has only a small battery, it 
will be unusable after some period of time. One solution is to add new sensors to replace the 
dead ones. These new sensors must be able to establish secure connections with each other 
and with previously deployed sensors. Therefore an important issue for a key establishment 
protocol is extensibility so new sensors can establish a secure connection with other sensors 
while maintaining security. 
All of the key establishment protocols examined in this chapter are scalable, i.e., new sensors 
can be added to the network such that they can communicate securely with existing nodes. For 
example, with the approach in [Du, 2004], if new sensors select their random keys from the 
current sub key pools, they should be able to establish a common key with the existing 
sensors. LAKE [Zhou & Fang, Apr. 2007], LPBK [Liu & Ning, 2003], and the approaches by Du 
[Du et. al., 2006] and Yu and Guan [Yu & Guan, 2008], are based on symmetric polynomials or 
the Blom scheme. If the secret information for new sensors is computed with the same 
symmetric polynomial or Blom matrix, these sensors can establish common keys with the old 
sensors. However, adding new sensors creates security concerns. As mentioned in Section 4-5, 
if an adversary captures a sufficient number of sensors, they can compromise common keys 
between uncompromised sensors. Further, once the number of captured sensors (old or new) 
reaches a threshold, an adversary can easily compromise the entire network. However, if the 
memory is allocated considering the addition of new sensors, the network will remain secure, 
but the sensor hardware must be able to support the needed memory. 
In our proposed protocol, new sensors can join the network without affecting security. The 
KDC can generate common keys for the new sensors considering the deployed sensors as 
well as those which will be distributed in the future. In the initialization phase, the KDC 
generates common keys for the first group of sensors to be deployed and also the group of 
sensors to next be deployed. For subsequent distributions, the KDC generates three types of 
common keys. The first are common keys for sensors to be distributed in the current period. 
The second are common keys with previously deployed sensors, and the last are common 
keys with sensors to be distributed next. Consequently, the proposed protocol is simply 
extensible without any security limitations. This solution can also be used for other schemes. 
For example, in LPBK, LAKE, and the approach by Yu and Guan, the KDC can generate 
new secret information for each time interval. In this case, the KDC must generate two 
shares for each sensor, the first using the new secret and the second using the previous 
secret. This solution at most doubles the required memory. 
4.7 Remarks 
As discussed in the previous sections, there are several important parameters in WSN key 
establishment protocols such as local connectivity, memory usage, key resilience, and 
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computational overhead. Tradeoffs exist between these parameters. For example, to achieve 
better resilience as shown in figure 5, the memory usage and the computational overhead 
(as shown in Table 4) must be increased. In this chapter, we proposed an intrinsically secure 
key establishment protocol for WSNs. In this protocol, the common key between two 
sensors is generated based on the secret key of one sensor and the identity of the other. It 
differs from other schemes such as LAKE, LPBK, Du-2, and Yu and Guan in that key 
resilience does not depend on any other parameters. In addition, the computational 
overhead in the proposed scheme is independent of other parameters. In other words, in the 
other schemes based on symmetric polynomials or the Blom scheme, to achieve high key 
resilience the security threshold must be increased. However, as discussed in Section 4-5, the 
processing overhead is also increased. The only dependent parameters in our scheme are 
local connectivity and memory usage. To achieve high local connectivity, the memory usage 
must be increased. As shown in figure 4, the local connectivity with HKey-HP is close to 
one, but the memory usage is higher than with the other protocols and the proposed 
models. Several models were proposed for different applications. For example, when the 
available memory is very limited, HKey-LR is most suitable. Thus, the proposed protocol 
provides a number of tradeoffs between local connectivity and memory usage. Since it is 
sensitive to fewer parameters than the other schemes, the design and analysis of our 
protocol is more flexible. 
5. Conclusions  
In this chapter, a new key establishment protocol in which a common key between two 
nodes is computed using the secret key of one node and the identity of the other has been 
proposed. Thus, the key is stored in only one sensor and is computed by the other sensor 
when necessary. Due to the unavoidable need for an offline KDC in wireless sensor 
networks, this simple idea yields an efficient solution to the challenging key management 
problem. Four different models were introduced to implement the proposed protocol. The 
first model, HKey-LR, is memory efficient, but has a local connectivity which is less than 
with the other models. Conversely, the fourth model, HKey-HP, has high local connectivity, 
but the memory usage is more than with the others. In all cases, the local connectivity of the 
proposed models is comparable to that with other well known schemes, and our models are 
more memory efficient under the perfect security condition. Since the proposed protocol 
only uses a hash function to compute the common key for one of the two nodes, it has low 
computational overhead compared with the other schemes. The security analysis shows that 
the proposed protocol is more robust in low resource situations. In summary, the proposed 
protocol is a practical, secure, efficient, and scalable key management protocol for wireless 
sensor networks. As shown in Table 4, the computational overhead for the proposed 
protocol is considerably less than with the other protocols, which indicates that the energy 
consumption should be lower.  
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